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CASENOTE
"IF THE PLAINTIFFS ARE RIGHT, GRUTTER IS
WRONG": WHY FISHER V UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SUPREME
COURT TO OVERTURN A FLAWED DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutionality of affirmative action in America's public
higher education institutions ("HEIs") gained prominence in the
late 1970s with the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.' The Bakke decision was less
than clear, but it provided the framework in which HEls formu-
lated their admission policies regarding the use of race.' Never-
theless, the law regarding affirmative action remained unsettled,
and the circuits remained split.'
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court decided Grutter v.
Bollinger.' Prior to Grutter, the Bakke decision was ambiguous
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Even prior to Bakke, however, the Court addressed the issue
of an HEI that denied students their equal protection rights because of race. See McLaurin
v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (holding that "the Four-
teenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race," and
that "[students of a particular race] must receive the same treatment at the hands of the
state as students of other races").
2. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) ("Since this Court's splintered
decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has
served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions poli-
cies."); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003) (relying on Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke).
3. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808-09 (1st Cir. 1998) (striking
down a race-based admissions program as unconstitutional), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash.
Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a race-
based admissions program).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
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and subject to criticisms from many angles,' but Grutter clarified
Bakke and outlined precisely how HEIs could avoid constitutional
infirmity in their use of race-based admissions by proclaiming
"diversity" as the end of such policies.6 Immediately following
Grutter, HEIs hurriedly reformulated their admission policies to
comport with the decision and take advantage of the newly solidi-
fied ruling,' which provided HEIs with an "end-around" the Con-
stitution's Equal Protection Clause.
Although twenty-five years elapsed between the Bakke and
Grutter decisions, the Court reexamined the issue of diversity, in
the context of public school districting in 2007 with Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. In
that case, the plaintiffs challenged a school district's student as-
signment plan that relied on race to determine which public
schools certain children could attend." Rather than overturning
Grutter, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion distinguished it from
Parents Involved." In so doing, Parents Involved took the initial
step toward isolating Grutter to a narrow set of facts." Chief Jus-
5. See, e.g., Mark T. Terrell, Note, Bucking Grutter: Why Critical Mass Should Be
Thrown Off the Affirmative-Action Horse, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 233, 240 (2011) (citations
omitted).
6. See Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, with Teeth? The Implications of Grutter v.
Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1, 43-44 (2009) (noting that the
Grutter decision "provided the foundations for a holding that the student body diversity is
a compelling constitutional interest").
7. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (W.D. Tex.
2009), affd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345) ("As articulated in [its] 2004 Proposal, [the University of Texas at Aus-
tin's ("UT")] underlying interest in its decision to consider race as one of the factors in its
admissions process closely mirrors the justification provided for the Michigan Law School's
use of race and approved by the Supreme Court [in Grutter]."); see also id. at 603 n.8
("UT's policy is explicitly and admittedly based on the [Michigan] Law School's policy and
the Grutter case.").
8. A plain reading of the Equal Protection Clause reveals no exceptions in the law's
text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the
Amendment's clarity and simplicity and instead has read certain exceptions into the law.
See generally PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 99-145 (2003) (dis-
cussing Bakke and subsequent cases).
9. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11
(2007).
10. Id. at 709-10.
11. Id. at 723.
12. See id. at 722-23. ("The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admis-
sions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as
a member of a particular racial group . . . . In the present cases, by contrast . .. race, for
some students, is determinative standing alone.") (citation omitted).
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tice Roberts emphasized Justice O'Connor's sunset provision from
Grutter," in which she wrote, "[Twenty-five] years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today."14 In contrast, Justice Thomas's concur-
rence pointed out that racial classifications have "no logical stop-
ping point" and threaten to become "ageless."" Indeed, the evi-
dence suggests Justice Thomas was correct, as more HEIs than
ever now employ racial preferences in admissions." Despite nar-
rowing Grutter, the Parents Involved Court did not go so far as to
overturn it, and Grutter survived.
Although Grutter clarified Bakke and provided guidance to
HEIs, its reasoning and holding were constitutionally unsound.
This has resulted in race-based admission policies in the nation's
HEIs that violate the Equal Protection Clause." Until now, chal-
lenges to these unconstitutional policies have failed to reach the
Supreme Court.'" However, in 2008 two plaintiffs filed a motion
challenging the constitutionality of the University of Texas at
Austin's ("UT") admission policy." Although the district court and
the Fifth Circuit both ruled against the motion,2 0 the plaintiffs
filed a petition for writ of certiorari,' which the Supreme Court
granted on February 21, 2012.22 The Fisher case fulfills Article
13. Id. at 731 (citation omitted) (discussing the circuit court's attention to Justice
O'Connor's provision).
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
15. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 760 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
16. See Robert VerBruggen, Racial Preferences by the Numbers, NAT'L REV. ONLINE
(Nov. 30, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228682/racial-prefere
nces-numbers/robert-verbruggen ("Few schools outright deny using the preferences.").
17. The University of Texas at Austin, for example, employs a race-based admission
policy. See Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions, The University of Tex-
as at Austin (June 25, 2004), available at http://www.utexas.edulstudent/admissionsla
bout/notices.html [hereinafter June 2004 Proposal].
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed,
550 U.S. 931 (2007).
19. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 2008 WL 7318505, aff'd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
20. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 11-345) (U.S. Feb. 2012),
2011 WL 4352286.
22. Fisher, 565 U.S. (2012) (No. 11-345) (order granting petition for grant of certi-
orari).
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III's "case or controversy" requirement2 3 providing the Court with
the opportunity to overturn Grutter's incorrect holding.24
One important step in overturning Grutter will require the
Court to retreat from the nearly complete deference it grants to
HEls in the design of their admission policies.25 Although the
Court is hesitant to do this, overwhelming social data undermine
the notion of the educational benefits that flow from diversity.26
Part II of this note serves two background purposes: first, to high-
light the empirical evidence contradicting the educational bene-
fits theory, and, second, to track the use of race in UT's admis-
sions from Bakke through the present.
Because it implicates race, UT's current admission policy is
subject to strict scrutiny-the Court's most arduous level of re-
view.27 There are two prongs to strict scrutiny analysis: a compel-
ling governmental interest and narrow tailoring." Part III of this
note discusses diversity in higher education as a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Empirical evidence reveals the Grutter Court
incorrectly solidified diversity as a compelling interest for racial
classifications and made it far too easy for HEIs to achieve their
social goals while disregarding the Constitution. Fisher presents
the Court with an opportunity to overturn the holding, thereby
restoring the protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The second prong of strict scrutiny requires the Court to decide
whether UT's policy is narrowly tailored to achieve diversity in
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. See Hans A. von Spakovsky, The University of Texas and Racial Preferences, NAT'L
REV. ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2011, 4:00 AM) http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/277519
/university-texas-and-racial-preferences-hans-von-spakovsky? (noting first, that the Grut-
ter decision was "misguided," and second, that, with regards to Fisher, "[o]pponents of dis-
crimination have good reason to hope that the Court could ... put[ an end to state-
sanctioned discrimination once and for all").
25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (citation omitted).
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of Petitioner, at 4-9,
Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 5007903 [hereinafter Heriot BriefJ.
27. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[AI1 racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
28. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) ("There are two
prongs to this examination. First, any racial classification must be justified by a compel-
ling governmental interest . . . . Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its
purpose must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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education. Part IV of this note argues that the admission policy
in question is not narrowly tailored because the Texas Top Ten
Percent Law ("Ten Percent Law") achieves substantially the same
diversity results as the suspect racial classifications. Moreover,
UT concedes that its policy is indistinguishable from the affirma-
tive action policy upheld in Grutter.o If there is no argument as to
distinguishability, then the survival of the Grutter policy in
American law depends upon the constitutionality of the UT poli-
cy. Therefore, if the Court strikes down the UT policy, it must
necessarily overturn Grutter.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Contrary to the beliefs of many affirmative action advocates,
evidence suggests that race-based preferences in higher education
negatively affect minority groups. Studies have found that enter-
ing credentials (SAT/ACT scores, high school GPA, etc.) matter,
and that the vast majority of students perform in the range their
entering credentials suggest." Thus, when HEIs accept minority
students with below-average credentials, those students generally
remain at the bottom of their graduating class.32 The problem is
exacerbated by the cascade effect: when top-tier HEIs relax
standards to admit more minorities, HEIs on every rung below
them follow suit." This results in minority students attending
schools where they disproportionately perform near the bottom of
the class and perhaps have a less beneficial educational experi-
29. However, if diversity in education cannot satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny
(as this note suggests), then any analysis of the "narrowly tailored" prong is unnecessary
and impossible, as the latter depends upon the former. See id. (citation omitted).
30. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. of Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 n.8., (W.D. Tex. 2009)
aff'd, 681 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012)
(No. 11-345).
31. See Todd Gaziano, Commissioner, United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Growing Evidence That College Preferences Harm Minority Students, FOUNDRY (Dec. 14,
2011, 9:28 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/14/the-growing-evidence-that-college-
preferences-harm-minority-students/ ("Those who have long supported discriminatory
preferences face a real dilemma when data show that most who are admitted with SAT
scores 150 points or more below a school's mean perform, sadly, pretty much as ex-
pected.").
32. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 72 (1998)
("[Clollege grades [for affirmative action beneficiaries] present a ... sobering picture ....
The grades earned by black students at the [most elite schools] often reflect their struggles
to succeed academically in highly competitive academic settings.").
33. See Heriot Brief, supra note 26.
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ence than they would at less competitive schools.34 Section A high-
lights social data contradicting UT's claim that its race-based
admission policy produces educational benefits.
Despite this evidence, UT, like many other HEIs, has commit-
ted to using race as an admissions factor.35 Since 1978, with the
exception of a nine-year period between 1996 and 2005, the color
of an applicant's skin has played a role in determining whether or
not UT admits the applicant." Since then, UT has simply modi-
fied its policy to comport with various court decisions. Section B
tracks the use of race in UT's admissions process from the Bakke
decision through the present.
A. Empirical Evidence"
Any argument opposing the legitimacy of diversity as a consti-
tutional exception to the Equal Protection Clause's categorical
prohibition on racial discrimination necessitates an examination
of the empirical evidence undergirding such an exception." A
quick glance at many of the affirmative action cases reveals nu-
merical calculations, percentages, charts, tables, and graphs
manifesting the Court's reliance on statistics and other data to
formulate its opinions in these cases.4o However, one must apply
34. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
35. See June 2004 Proposal, supra note 17.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 n.8 (W.D. Tex.
2009), affd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345).
38. This part of the note attempts neither to comprehensively discuss all the statisti-
cal data in this area of the law nor to argue for or against affirmative action as a policy
matter. Rather, the aim of this limited discussion of research and data is merely to provide
a contextual frame for the subsequent constitutional discussion by substantiating a gen-
eral correlation between students whose race is a factor in admission and their potential
academic and career performances.
39. Despite unanimous agreement on this point, the Grutter decision highlights the
Justices' disagreement as to whom the Court should trust to find and analyze data with
regard to affirmative action policies and their effects. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 328 (2003) ("The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essen-
tial to its educational mission is one to which we defer."), with id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) ("The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objec-
tive with deference to the implementation of this goal. In the context of university
admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical data known
to us, but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which it is pur-
sued.").
40. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the appropriate weight to the various numbers frequently cited
by proponents and opponents of affirmative action.
One example of a statistic often cited by supporters of affirma-
tive action is the increase in minority representation in HEIs that
employ such admission policies.4 1 The increase is particularly ir-
relevant. When HEls give admission preferences to persons of a
certain race, the expectation of any result other than an increase
in the race's representation would be confounded. Besides being
obvious on its face, the argument of increased minority enroll-
ment incorrectly assumes that diversity itself is the end of af-
firmative action.4 2 It is not.3 Rather, achieving beneficial societal
and economic effects of diversity in higher education is the end of
race-based preferences.44 In a report arguing in favor of affirma-
tive action in HEls, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights (the "USCCR") affirmed this point:
Historically, the Commission has found that achieving diversity in
the classrooms of this nation's colleges and universities is a compel-
ling-indeed essential-social, economic, and educational goal. With
a growing percentage of minorities making up the working popula-
tion, the nation's economic vitality will depend on how well minority
youth are educated.4 5
Because the ultimate goal of granting racial preferences to minor-
ities is to increase their contributions to the nation's society and
economy (rather than merely attending an HEI), the following
41. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the Black Student Alliance at UT & the NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Appellees at 17, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 09-50823), 2010 WL 2624791 (emphasizing that an additional 435 African
American students were admitted to UT in the year in which the school adopted the race-
conscious policy), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
42. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Marcus, Diversity & Race-Neutrality, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 163, 167 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/col
loquy/2008/39/LRColl2008n39Marcus.pdf ("[I]ncreasing racial or ethnic representation is
not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the use of racial preferences.").
43. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30 ("The Law School's interest is not simply 'to assure
within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of
its race . . . . Rather, the Law School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to
the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce."' (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978))).
44. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
45. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE COMMISSION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND
CURRENT CHALLENGES FACING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION (2003) (emphasis add-
ed), available at http://www.usccr.gov/aaction/ccraa.htm.
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sections discuss how affirmative action affects minorities in pres-
tigious career fields."
1. Minorities in Science and Engineering
As three commissioners on the USCCR point out in their ami-
cus brief to the Court, "It should surprise no one that those who
fail to attain their goal of a science or engineering degree are dis-
proportionately students whose entering academic credentials put
them in the bottom of their college class." Science and engineer-
ing degrees and careers require rigorous academic training. Be-
cause of the arduous requirements, high demand exists for stu-
dents entering the science and engineering fields.4 Indeed, it is
important that minorities fill a substantial number of these posi-
tions.49 Unfortunately, the modern means of achieving this goal-
namely, affirmative action-have been largely unsuccessful.
Empirical studies suggest that students whose entering cre-
dentials put them in the middle or top of their class are more like-
ly to succeed in science and engineering careers than otherwise
identical students whose credentials put them in the bottom of
their class." The studies sought to identify why minority students
46. This section follows the structure of, and relies heavily on, the amicus brief of
three commissioners of the USCCR. See Heriot Brief, supra note 26. The reason for this is
that the Court apparently relies heavily on the parties' amici for evidentiary justification
for the supposed educational benefits that flow from diversity. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328
("The Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is
substantiated by respondents and their amici.").
47. Heriot Brief, supra note 26, at 9.
48. Motoko Rich, The Rising Value of a Science Degree, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2012),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/201 1/10/20/the-rising-value-of-a-science-degree/.
49. DONNA J. NELSON & CHRISTOPHER N. BRAMMER, A NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
MINORITIES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING FACULTIES AT RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 2 (2d
ed. 2010), available at http://www.faculty-staff.ou.edu/N/Donna.J.Nelson-1/diversity/Fac
ulty-Tables-FYO7/07Report.pdf ("Underrepresented minorities are projected to constitute
almost 32% of the American population by 2020, outnumbering White males (30.1%).
Therefore, proactive steps should be taken now in order to insure the proportionate inclu-
sion of such a large part of the U.S. population in science and engineering ... ) (quoting
Dr. Donna J. Nelson, Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma) (citation omitted).
50. See Richard Sander & Roger Bolus, Do Credentials Gaps in College Reduce the
Number of Minority Science Graduates? (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/sciencemismatch.pdf (investigating the possible explanation
of black and Hispanic underrepresentation in science); cf. Rogers Elliott et al., The Role of
Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly Selective Institutions, 37 RES. IN
HIGHER EDUC. 681, 695, 699 (1996); Frederick L. Smyth & John J. McArdle, Ethnic and
Gender Differences in Science Graduation at Selective Colleges with Implications for Ad-
mission Policy and College Choice, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 353, 358, 371 (2004).
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fail to manifest a noted substantial initial interest in pursuing
science careers." Professor Roger Elliott's study concluded that
"preadmission variables accounted for a significant fraction of the
variance in persistence decisions, while ethnicity did not."5 2 Pro-
fessor Richard Sander's study includes the following data on Uni-
versity of Michigan students who began their college careers en-
rolled at the College of Arts and Sciences:
Index Range of Students as a
Weighted Index of SAT Scores and
Outcome Race High School GPAs
Less than 820 or
660 above
Graduation in four Black 21% 50% 73%
years White 35% 52% 70%
Final major is in sci- Black 5% 23% 43%
ence or engineering White 4% 16% 33%
The data highlight the higher attrition rate for science and en-
gineering degrees for both black and white students whose SAT
scores and GPAs were relatively low." Therefore, minority stu-
dents are not helped in contributing to the science and engineer-
ing fields by HEIs' admission policies (especially the most selec-
tive ones) that compensate for less competitive entering
credentials with race.
2. Minorities in Academia
Similar to the problem of too few minorities in science and en-
gineering, minorities also comprise only a small percentage of
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. For discussion on Professor Elliott's
study, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF HISTOR-
ICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 2 (2010).
52. Elliott, supra note 50, at 695 (emphasis added).
53. Sander & Bolus, supra note 50, at 7 tbl. 4.
54. See id. at 7 ("Whether one considers concentration in the sciences and engineer-
ing, or graduation rates, entering credentials have a dramatic effect upon outcomes."); see
also Elliott, supra note 50, at 702 (calculating that a student with an SAT score of 580
"who wants to be in science will be three or four times more likely to persist at [the least
competitive schools] than at [the most competitive schools]").
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full-time professors at the country's research universities." Also
similar is the reason why minorities seldomly pursue careers as
professors in academia. A 2003 study seeking to understand why
more minorities are not attracted to academic careers found that
"[t]he prime reason given by minority students was lower under-
graduate grades."" Tethered to this was the conclusion that lower
undergraduate grades are the result of students' admission to
schools at which their credentials are below average.
Because of affirmative action . .. African Americans ... are admitted
to schools where, on average, white students' scores are substantial-
ly higher, exceeding those of African Americans by about 200 points
or more. Not surprisingly, in this kind of competitive situation, Afri-
can Americans get relatively low grades. It is a fact that in virtually
all selective schools . . . where racial preferences in admission is
practiced, the majority of African American students end up in the
57lower quarter of their class.
Cole and Barner further state,
African American students at the elite schools ... get lower grades
than students with similar levels of academic preparation (as meas-
ured by SAT scores) than African American students at the nonelite
schools . .. . Lower grades lead to lower levels of academic self-
confidence, which in turn influence the extent to which African
American students will persist with a freshman interest in academia
as a career. African American students at elite schools are signifi-
cantly less likely to persist with an interest in academia than are
their counterparts at nonelite schools. 8
As one review of the report writes, "There can be no significant
improvement in black faculty representation unless and until
there is a progressively larger number of black college students
who go on to graduate school."" In order to make it to graduate
school, however, minority students must earn better undergradu-
ate grades. Unfortunately, as long as affirmative action policies
55. OFFICE OF PLANNING & INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT, PENN STATE UNIV.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSORS: TIME IN RANK 2 (2007) (citation omitted), available at http://
www.psu.edulpresident/pialplanning-research/reports/assoc-prof time inrank_07.pdf "In
2005, minority faculty members represented 12% of full-time instructional professors at
all degree-granting institutions in the nation.").
56. John H. Bunzel, Elusive Quest to Boost Minorities in Academia, S. F. CHRON.,
Mar. 6, 2005, at C3, (emphasis added) (citing STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREAS-
ING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY
STUDENTS 100-07 (2003)).
57. COLE & BARBER, supra note 56, at 124 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 212.
59. Bunzel, supra note 56.
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permit minorities to enroll at HEIs where they will likely remain
near the bottom of their class, the number of minorities in aca-
demia will remain inadequate.
3. Minorities in Law
Law, like other prestigious career fields, suffers from low mi-
nority representation." "The statistics are shocking . . . . Given all
the attention paid to affirmative action, one might imagine that
the legal profession would have made more progress."6 1 But it has
not. And the reason is the counterproductive effects of race-based
preferences in the nation's law schools.
In 2004, Professor Sander published a study answering the fol-
lowing question: Does affirmative action in American law schools
clearly help black students more than it hurts them?6 2 The study
concluded that the benefit of increasing the number of black stu-
dents in the nation's top law schools is far outweighed by the
harmful effects endured by beneficiaries of racial preferences.
As previously demonstrated, minorities admitted to schools
where they have below-average credentials generally perform
near the bottom of their class." Professor Sander's study showed
that over half of black law students had first-year GPAs in the
bottom 10% of their class, as opposed to only 5.6% of white stu-
dents." More-over, 19.3% of enrolled blacks failed to graduate
from law school compared to 8.2% of whites.6 Most important is
the failure to pass the bar exam on the first attempt of 71% of
blacks with low academic credentials compared to 52% of white
students with identical credentials. Finally, only 45% of all black
law students who began law school in 1991 graduated from law
60. See Edward Iwata, Legal Industry Still Lacking in Minorities, USA TODAY, Sept.
9, 2004, at 3B (citation omitted) (noting that fewer than ten percent of the nation's attor-
neys are minorities).
61. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Chambliss, Law Professor, New York University School of
Law).
62. See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 478 (2004).
63. See id. at 478-81.
64. See supra Part II.A.2.
65. See Sander, supra note 62 at 427 tbl. 5.1; see also Heriot Brief, supra note 26, at
16.
66. See Sander, supra note 62, at 437 tbl. 5.5.
67. See id. at 446 tbl. 6.2.
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school, took the bar, and passed on their first attempt." The rate
for white students was more than 78%."
Drawing on Professor Sander's research, several USCCR com-
missioners concluded the following in their amicus brief to the
Court:
[I]f law schools were to use race-neutral admission policies, fewer Af-
rican-American law students would be admitted to law schools. But
since those who were admitted would be attending schools where
they had a substantial likelihood of doing well, fewer would fail or
drop out. In the end, more would pass the bar on their first try and
more would eventually pass the bar than under current admissions
'70practices.
Therefore, race-based preferences allow African American stu-
dents to enroll in law schools where they often have less competi-
tive entering credentials, receive correspondingly low grades, fail
to pass the bar on their first attempt, and, consequently, struggle
in their legal careers.
In light of this evidence, it is difficult to understand why UT
continues to allow race to compensate for low entering credentials
in its admission policy. The following section discusses UT's race-
based admission policy, and its evolution since Bakke.
B. Evolution of UT's Race-Based Admission Policy
Over the years, affirmative action in Texas higher education
has taken three forms. Prior to 1996, with the splintered Bakke
decision looming, UT used race as an express factor in admis-
sions." A crucial turning point in UT's race-based admissions
came when the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v. Texas in 1996."
The Hopwood court struck down UT Law School's admission poli-
cy, which gave "substantial racial preferences" to minority appli-
cants." In response to the decision, the Texas legislature enacted
68. Id. at 454.
69. Id.
70. Heriot Brief, supra note 26, at 19-20 (citation omitted).
71. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
72. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
73. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.
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the Ten Percent Law." In 2003, Grutter abrogated Hopwood, and
UT again altered its admissions to fit the framework of the Su-
preme Court's decision.15
1. Pre-Hopwood Policy (1978-1996)
Relying on a fractured and unhelpful Bakke decision, UT used
two metrics in admissions between the years of 1978 and 1996:
the Academic Index ("AI") and race.7 ' The AI is still in use today
and is not contentious. It is a computation based on the appli-
cant's high school class rank, standardized test scores, and high
school curriculum. Prior to Hopwood, UT was unabashed about
its race-conscious admissions process" because courts had not de-
cided the constitutionality of such a practice." In 1996, however,
the Fifth Circuit held that UT Law School "may not use race as a
factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a
diverse student body."o Moreover, the Hopwood court called the
use of race in admissions with the goal of achieving diversity a
"constitutional infirmit[y]."'
2. Post-Hopwood Policy (1996-2003)
In response to the Hopwood decision, the Texas legislature en-
acted the Ten Percent Law in 1997. The Ten Percent Law was
designed as a race-neutral means of achieving diversity at UT
while maintaining meritocratic admissions." The Ten Percent
74. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.303 (West 2006); see also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
75. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225 ("In August 2003, the [UT] Board of Regents author-
ized the institutions within the [UT] system to examine whether to consider an applicant's
race and ethnicity in admissions in accordance with the standards enunciated in Grutter.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See id. at 222.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 223 ("[I]t is undisputed that race was considered directly and was often
a controlling factor in admission.") (citation omitted).
79. See id. at 222 ("There were then no clear legal limits on a university's use of race
in admissions. The Supreme Court decided Bakke in 1978 but its guidance came in a frac-
tured decision, leaving a quarter century of uncertainty.").
80. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2006); see Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
83. Cf. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 ("The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit
students on the basis of race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target
and their admission a large, if not primary, purpose.").
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Law requires Texas's public universities to "admit an applicant
for admission ... if the applicant graduated with a grade point
average in the top 10 percent of the student's high school gradu-
ating class."84 The law has not been challenged and remains in ef-
fect," although it is currently supplemented by the controversial
Grutter-style policy."
3. Post-Grutter Policy (2003-Present)
As the Fisher court noted, "Hopwood's prohibitions [against us-
ing race as a factor in admissions] ended . .. with the Supreme
Court's 2003 decision in Grutter."" The Grutter Court held that
"the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit [a] narrowly tai-
lored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a di-
verse student body."" After the decision, UT's Board of Regents
commissioned two studies, which concluded that the school lacked
a critical mass of underrepresented minorities and insufficient
minority representation in the classroom blocked the presence of
the full benefits of diversity." The year-long studies resulted in
UT's adoption of an admission policy, beginning with the 2005
admission cycle, in which UT incorporated race as one of multiple
factors in its admission decisions. 0
The admission policy as it currently exists allots ninety percent
of all available undergraduate seats to Texas residents.91 Stu-
dents admitted under the Ten Percent Law fill the majority of
these seats.92 After admitting those students, UT fills the remain-
84. Tex. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a).
85. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
86. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
87. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224-25.
88. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
89. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225. According to UT's June 2004 Proposal, the "full bene-
fits of diversity" include "break[ing] down stereotypes, promot[ing] cross-racial under-
standing, and prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workplace and society." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing June 2004 Proposal, supra note 17).
90. See id. at 226, 230.
91. Id. at 227. The other two categories of applicants, which account for the remaining
ten percent of available seats, are domestic non-Texas residents and international stu-
dents. See id. Because the Fisher plaintiffs are Texas residents, the admissions processes
for these other two categories require no discussion. Id.
92. See id. (noting, for example, that in 2008, "81% of the entering class was admitted
under the Ten Percent Law," leaving only nine percent of all available seats for Texas res-
idents not admitted under the Ten Percent Law).
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ing seats on the basis of the AI and the Personal Achievement In-
dex ("PAI")." Some applicants have high enough AI scores to gain
admission without consideration of their PAI scores.94 However,
applications of students with low AI scores receive a final review
that takes into account PAI scores."
The PAI is composed of the average score of two essays and a
personal achievement score." Like the AI, the quantitative essay
score is merit-based and noncontroversial. The personal achieve-
ment score, on the other hand, involves the holistic review of a
number of qualitative factors including the applicant's leadership
qualities, work experience, socioeconomic status, and race." The
Fifth Circuit emphasizes that race-like all other elements of the
personal achievement score-is not considered alone." At the
same time, however, the Fifth Circuit admits the district court
was correct in asserting that race "is undisputedly a meaningful
factor that can make a difference in the evaluation of a student's
application."" The current policy led to the district court's obser-
vation that it "has difficulty imagining an admissions policy that
93. See id.
94. See id. Again, the AI is a non-controversial aspect of the admission policy because
it simply ranks applicants based on their merits. See id. (describing the AI as a "mechani-
cal formula that predicts freshman GPA using standardized test scores and high school
class rank").
95. See id.
96. See id. at 227-28. However, the personal achievement score (which is the constitu-
tionally suspect part of the PAI) receives one-third more weight than the average essay
score, as evidenced by the PAI formula: PAI = ((personal achievement score * 4) + (average
essay score * 3)) - 7. See id. at 228 n.80.
97. Id. at 228 (citation omitted). Judge Higginbotham's characterization of the pur-
pose of the personal achievement score is interesting: "This personal achievement score is
designed to recognize qualified students whose merit as applicants was not adequately
reflected by their [AI]." Id. Judge Higginbotham toes-but does not cross-the line of ad-
mitting that the personal achievement score rejects meritocracy as the sole criterion of
admission, even though the use of non-merit-based qualities is the personal achievement
score's raison d'itre. Also interesting in this respect is the desire of certain defenders of
affirmative action to eliminate all meritocratic metrics in the admissions process. See, e.g.,
DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PARTY, http://www.umich.edu/daap/ (click on "Program")
(last visited May 1, 2012) (advocating for the elimination of "the SAT, ACT, and other bi-
ased and discriminatory standardized tests in the [University of Michigan] admissions
processes").
98. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 230 (noting "[r]ace-like all other elements of UT's holistic
review-is not considered alone"); see also id. at 228 ("None of the elements of the personal
achievement score-including race-are considered individually. . .
99. Id. at 230.
2012] 1127
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
could more closely resemble the Michigan Law School's admis-
sions policy upheld and approved by the Supreme Court in Grut-
ter."00
III. DIVERSITY AS A COMPELLING INTEREST
One purpose of the judicially created strict scrutiny test is to
distinguish between "ordinary" rights and liberties, which the
government may regulate with little justification, and "preferred"
or fundamental rights, which are entitled to greater protection
against government interference."o' One such fundamental right,
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides equal protection of the laws to every indi-
vidual, regardless of the individual's race.'02 Accordingly,
"[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect."' Because race-based classifica-
tions trigger strict scrutiny, they can only be upheld when justi-
fied by a "compelling governmental interest."'0 4 The following sec-
tions introduce examples of compelling interests, emphasize the
tenuousness of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, discuss the vari-
ous opinions in Grutter, and argue that allowing diversity as a
compelling interest has neutered strict scrutiny's first prong.
A. Instances of Compelling Interests
The threshold for proving a compelling interest is so high it has
led many to believe that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fa-
tal in fact."0 ' However, the Court has identified several compel-
100. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 612 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd,
631 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-
345).
101. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1285
(2007) ("The modern strict scrutiny test arose as advice to implement ... the Supreme
Court's solidifying commitment to a jurisprudential distinction between ordinary rights
and liberties, which the government could regulate upon the showing of any rational justi-
fication, and more fundamental or 'preferred' liberties entitled to more stringent judicial
protection.").
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
103. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
104. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (citation omit-
ted) (holding that both federal and state racial classifications "must serve a compelling
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
105. See Fallon, supra note 101, at 1304. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326
1128 [Vol. 46:1113
FISHER V UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
ling interests that can (or could) provide constitutionally suffi-
cient justification for race- or ethnicity-based classifications. In
Korematsu v. United States, the Court held that national security
was a sufficient justification for the federal government to detain
and exclude Japanese-Americans from certain areas on the West
Coast.'06 Following Brown v. Board of Education, the Court, in a
number of cases, held that remedying past discrimination is a
governmental interest compelling enough to justify racial classifi-
cations."o' The compelling interest implicated in Fisher-diversity
in higher education-found its origins in Bakkeo' and its solidifi-
cation in Grutter.'09 However, the Grutter Court was wrong to so-
lidify diversity as a compelling governmental interest within the
context of Equal Protection jurisprudence.
B. Bakke and Powellian Diversity
In 1974, Allan Bakke filed suit challenging the admission poli-
cy of the University of California at Davis Medical School ("UC"),
which set aside sixteen of 100 total seats exclusively for minority
applicants."' Although the Court ultimately struck down the poli-
cy, the case produced six separate and diverging opinions."' Jus-
tice Powell's plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court was anything but clear or conclusive.
None of the other Justices concurred with the part of Justice
Powell's opinion containing the most significant implications for
future race-based admissions-namely, that "the State has a sub-
(2003) (holding that "[s]trict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact") (emphasis
added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). Although the Court has
not explicitly overturned Korematsu, it has since recognized only two compelling interests
for using racial classifications: remedying the effects of past discrimination and diversity.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720, 722
(2007).
107. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
108. See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University
of Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grut-
ter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 444 (2011) ("[T]he Bakke opinion sparked the diversity
fire, for before Bakke, the notion that diversity could be a compelling governmental inter-
est was never suggested.").
109. See Killenbeck, supra note 6, at 27 (recognizing Grutter as the first instance in
which the Court held "clearly and unequivocally" that diversity is a compelling interest).
110. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275-78 (1978).
111. See id. at 265, 324, 379, 387, 402, 408.
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stantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the . . . consideration of
race and ethnic origin.""2 In Diversity: The Invention of a Concept,
Peter Wood, President of the National Association of Scholars,"'
made the following observation:
Powell's Bakke opinion, however, lifted diversity out of obscurity and
gave it the respectability of seeming law .... The happenstance that
none of his Supreme Court colleagues joined Powell in extolling di-
versity tends to be overlooked, and those who are now committed to
promoting the idea are perhaps reluctant to remember that the
widely cited legal foundation for pursuing diversity in schools and
colleges rests on one man's unsupported opinion.114
The lack of a diversity argument in UC's Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari also indicates that diversity as a compelling interest was a
purely Powellian invention."' Further, in its subsequent brief to
the Court, the petitioner relied on Brown's "goal of educational
opportunity unimpaired by the effects of racial discrimination,"
but not diversity, to justify its race-based admissions."'
C. The Grutter Opinions
Contrary to Bakke, the respondents in Grutter used the singu-
lar justification of diversity in defending their race-based admis-
sion policy against constitutional challenges."' In Grutter, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged Bakke's ambiguity and set out to clarify
whether Powellian diversity was indeed controlling by "re-
solv[ing] the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a
question of national importance.""' Justice O'Connor began her
112. Id. at 320.
113. NAS Staff & Boards, NAT'L Ass'N OF SCHOLARS, http://www.nas.org/about/
staff-boards (last visited May 1, 2012).
114. WOOD, supra note 8, at 113 (emphasis omitted).
115. See Thompson & Schiff, supra note 108, at 445 (citing WOOD, supra note 8, at 106)
("The diversity argument does not appear in the section of the UC petition giving reasons
why the Supreme Court should hear the case.") (emphasis omitted).
116. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 189474.
117. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003) ("[R]espondents assert only
one justification for their use of race in the admissions process: obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 322. The "question of national importance" was "[w]hether diversity is a
compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting appli-
cants for admission to public universities." Id. Despite Justice O'Connor's noted ambiguity
with regards to Bakke, respondents unreservedly refer to Bakke-specifically Powell's di-
versity-as "settled precedent." Brief for Respondents at 12, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-
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discussion of the issue on the defensive by stating, "[W]e have
never held that the only governmental use of race that can sur-
vive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination.""' However,
Justice O'Connor did not willingly accept the converse-that the
Court may not simply invent a compelling interest when it wants.
Justice O'Connor moved away from the clearest interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause, which makes zero exceptions for
racial classifications,12 0 and instead actively interpreted the clause
to allow HEls to pursue the socio-political goal of increasing mi-
nority representation at elite institutions."' Supreme Court prec-
edent forthrightly rejects governmental classifications "motivated
by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial poli-
tics.""' In light of this precedent, Justice O'Connor affords far too
much deference to Michigan Law School's contention that its sole
goal was obtaining "the educational benefits that flow from stu-
dent body diversity."' Justice O'Connor hardly challenged the
supposition that such "benefits" even exist. Quoting Bakke, she
wrote,
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a
diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse
student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is "pre-
sumed" absent "a showing to the contrary." 24
241), 2003 WL 402236.
119. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
120. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institu-
tions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences
in state educational institutions are OK, today's [Grutter decision] seems perversely de-
signed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.").
121. Id. at 343 (majority opinion). Interestingly, the Court has interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause in the higher education context differently depending on the social goal
the Court hoped to achieve. Compare McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ.,
339 U.S. 637, 642 (1958) (holding that "the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences
in treatment by the state based upon race" in order to secure equal protection rights for a
black student), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the . . . use of race in admissions" in order to increase the diversity at
HEIs) (emphasis added).
122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
123. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 118, at 14.
124. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
205 at 318-19) (1978)).
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Part II of this note presents "a showing to the contrary."25 With
such evidence staring the Court in its face in Fisher, the Court
should refrain from simply deferring to UT.
In his Grutter dissent, Justice Scalia takes an overt shot at the
majority opinion and its acceptance of Michigan Law School's
stated interest in the educational benefits of diversity by declar-
ing that the university's "mystical ... justification for its discrim-
ination by race challenges even the most gullible mind.""' Justice
Thomas also criticized the majority along the same lines: "[T]he
Constitution [does not] countenance the unprecedented deference
the Court gives to the Law School, an approach inconsistent with
the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."127 By taking Michigan Law
School at its word and ignoring a plethora of statistical evidence
contradicting the concept of the "benefits" of diversity, the Grutter
majority allowed Michigan Law School to maintain its elite sta-
tus, while also increasing minority enrollment by admitting stu-
dents who, except for their race or ethnicity, would not otherwise
gain admission. Although on its face this seems the perfect solu-
tion, Justice Thomas correctly points out that "[r]acial discrimi-
nation is not a permissible solution to the self-inflicted wounds of
[an] elitist admissions policy." 128
D. Diversity in Fisher
From the beginning of the Fisher litigation, UT has relied on
diversity as a compelling state interest in defending its admission
policy against the plaintiffs' challenge.'" UT's reliance on diversi-
ty shows how Grutter completely changed the process for satisfy-
ing the compelling governmental interest requirement of strict
scrutiny. HEIs are now able to blow through strict scrutiny's first
prong simply by invoking the supposed educational benefits of di-
125. See supra Part II. More importantly, the USCCR's amicus brief to the Court pre-
sents such evidence, and the Court relies heavily on amicus support in this regard. See
supra note 43.
126. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Id. (emphasis added). Michigan Law School's own expert testified that isolating
race as an admissions factor accounted for an increase in minority enrollment of more
than three-fold. See id. at 320 (majority opinion).
129. See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, (W.D. Tex. May 5, 2008) (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS),
2008 WL 7318506.
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versity in education. 130 Grutter also set the precedent for courts to
give almost complete deference to HEls' claims that such "bene-
fits" in fact do flow from increased minority enrollment. 13' This
proposition is no longer questioned, but rather assumed, despite
vast evidence to the contrary.132 In Fisher, UT offered almost no
evidence that diversity actually produces the benefits that make
it a compelling interest because it knows it does not need to do
so.1 33 Instead, it merely cites figures showing increased minority
enrollment as a result of affirmative action, which falsely as-
sumes that diversity itself is the end. 134
When the Court decides Fisher, it will have the opportunity to
right its wrong in Grutter by reversing the notion that diversity
justifies governmental racial classifications. It will have the op-
portunity to give more deference to the language of the Equal
Protection Clause and less to UT's conclusory statement that its
racial preferences fit within it."' By so doing, the Court will once
again give teeth to strict scrutiny's first prong in the context of
higher education.
130. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603-04 (W.D. Tex.
2009) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that UT's policy is untethered to any educational
benefits because the Supreme Court "recognized in Grutter that '[t]he Law School's educa-
tional judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which
we defer') (citation omitted). The Fisher court goes on to say that it "fail[ed] to see how
UT's determination is improper or renders its consideration of race unconstitutional" be-
cause "Grutter explicitly authorizes universities to exercise its discretion" in how they use
race. Id. at 606.
131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
132. One of the main supposed benefits of diversity is cross-racial understanding. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. However, under race-based admission policies, the number of
whites remains constant while the number of minorities increases. Therefore, it is not the
minorities who are gaining the benefit of better understanding whites. Instead, the oppo-
site is true. All the "benefits" of cross-racial understanding go to whites who supposedly
now are better able to understand people of different ethnic backgrounds. See, e.g., Joshua
M. Levine, Stigma's Opening: Grutter's Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Af-
firmative Action in Higher Education, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 457, 478 (2006) (noting that under
Justice Powell's rationale, "[d]iversity wins because whites benefit") (emphasis added). It
is difficult to imagine a more patronizing system for minorities. HEls tell minority appli-
cants they were not good enough to gain admission based on standards of merit. But, the
HEls will admit them anyway so whites can observe their behavior and gain a "better un-
derstanding" of them.
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
134. See discussion supra Part II.A.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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IV. NARROW TAILORING
Assuming arguendo that diversity in education is indeed a
compelling governmental interest on which UT may rely, its race-
based admission policy still fails to satisfy strict scrutiny's narrow
tailoring prong. "[S]tate legislation that expressly distinguishes
among citizens because of their race . . . [must] be narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling governmental interest.""' Section A
explains why the UT policy is not the least restrictive means of
achieving diversity and argues that the Court should strike down
the policy on narrow tailoring grounds. Section B argues that be-
cause the UT policy so closely resembles Michigan Law School's
policy from Grutter, if one is not narrowly tailored, neither is the
other.
A. Least Restrictive Means
UT's policy fails on narrow tailoring grounds because it is not
the least restrictive means of achieving diversity.' In strict scru-
tiny analysis, "the court should ask whether the challenged regu-
lation is the least restrictive means among available, effective al-
ternatives."' However, narrow tailoring analysis with regards to
the least restrictive means is not clear-cut.'39 UT is not required
to take burdensome steps in testing every possible race-neutral
alternative to affirmative action, but UT must seriously consider
using race-neutral alternatives that work "about as well."14' The
Ten Percent Law works "about as well" as (if not better than)
136. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As
the quote demonstrates, there must first be a compelling governmental interest before the
Court can undertake narrow tailoring analysis. Therefore, this part of the note assumes
that those reading it disagree with Part III. See supra note 29.
137. See Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.
1993) ("The essence of the 'narrowly tailored' inquiry is the notion that explicit racial pref-
erences . .. must be only a 'last resort' option.").
138. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
139. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) ("Narrow tailoring does not re-
quire exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative . . . . Narrow tailoring does,
however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives
. .") (emphasis added).
140. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (internal citation
omitted).
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UT's race-conscious admission policy'. and places no burden on
UT because it is already in place and institutionalized.
Pre-Hopwood, before there were clear legal limits on the use of
race in admissions, UT used race as one of two metrics. 14 2 In 1993,
this unfettered, direct use of race resulted in an entering class
that included 238 African American students (4.5% of the overall
class) and 832 Hispanic students (15.6% of the overall class).'43
These figures can be understood as nothing short of UT's ideal
number, or "critical mass," of African American and Hispanic
students because at that point the courts had not restricted UT's
use of race.
After the Hopwood court struck down UT's race-based admis-
sion policy in 1996, UT adopted the Ten Percent Law. Under the
Ten Percent Law, the 2004 entering class (the last class before
Grutter took effect) included 309 African American students (4.5%
of the overall class) and 1149 Hispanic students (16.9% of the
overall class).'4 Additionally, the Ten Percent Law accounted for
the admission of 77% of enrolled African American students and
78% of enrolled Hispanic students.14 ' Thus, the Ten Percent Law,
which relies on merit as opposed to racial classifications and is
entirely compatible with the Equal Protection Clause, resulted in
slightly increased minority enrollment when compared to the un-
fettered use of race.
None other than the UT president himself, Dr. Larry Faulkner,
lauded the Ten Percent Law and its effects on diversity enroll-
ment:
[Tihe Top 10 Percent Law has enabled us to diversify enrollment at
UT Austin with talented students who succeed. Our 1999 enrollment
levels for African American and Hispanic freshmen have returned to
141. The majority in Grutter rejected the argument made for percentage plans as a
race-neutral alternative. That rejection, however, was based on the fact that percentage
plans do not work specifically for graduate and professional schools (as opposed to under-
graduate institutions like UT). See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. Additionally, the majority
held that a percentage plan would force the law school to abandon its academic selectivity.
Id. However, state legislatures reserve the right to balance state universities' academic
selectivity with educational policy goals. The Court's rejection of legislatively adopted per-
centage plans as a policy matter infringes on this right.
142. See supra Part II.B.
143. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
144. See id. at 224.
145. Id.
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those of 1996, the year before the Hopwood decision prohibited the
consideration of race in admission policies. And minority students
earned higher grade point averages last year than in 1996 and have
higher retention rates. An impressive 94.9 percent of 1998 African
American freshmen returned to enroll for their sophomore year in
1999. For Hispanics, 85.8 percent returned for their second year. So,
the law is helping us to create a more representative student body
146
and enroll students who perform well academically.
Dr. Faulkner's statement and the pre- and post-Hopwood figures
demonstrate that UT can achieve sufficient (if not ideal) levels of
minority enrollment without the use of "inherently suspect" racial
classifications."' Therefore, UT's personal achievement score,
which accounts for applicants' race and scores some races higher
than others,"' is not the least restrictive means available of
achieving diversity as required by narrow tailoring.149
The Court should strike down UT's race-based policy because it
does not satisfy the second prong of strict scrutiny. At the same
time, UT insists that its policy directly resembles the policy from
Grutter."' Therefore, striking down the policy from Fisher neces-
sarily requires overturning Grutter, and the Court should do
both.
B. Possible Approaches to UT's Policy
The defendant, the district court, and the Fifth Circuit majority
in Fisher all extolled the similarities between UT's use of race in
admissions and Michigan Law School's use of race in admis-
sions.'"' For those eager to uphold UT's policy and racial prefer-
ences generally, this appears, at least on the surface, to be the
best approach (otherwise, presumably, UT would have argued
something different). However, "doubling down" on Grutter is a
high-risk, high-reward strategy that could backfire depending on
146. Larry R. Faulkner, The 'Top 10 Percent Law" Is Working for Texas, U. OF
TEXAS AT AUSTIN (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.utexas.edulpresident/past/faulkner/speech
es/ten -percent_101900.pdf (indicating these remaks appeared as a guest editorial in mul-
tiple Texas newspapers).
147. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746
(2007) ("Government action dividing us by race is inherently suspect.").
148. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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how the Court analyzes UT's policy. The Court can approach its
analysis of UT's policy in several ways.
First, it can uphold the policy on grounds that it was construct-
ed exactly on the Grutter model, and, because the Grutter decision
is binding, UT's policy must be constitutional and narrowly tai-
lored. This approach would reaffirm Grutter and further define
the hoops through which HEls can jump to ensure their racial
preferences will be upheld. This would be the high-reward ap-
proach from the perspective of UT and other HEls because it not
only upholds UT's policy, but it also strengthens the case for ra-
cial preferences in education generally.
Second, the Court could take a middle ground approach to
Fisher. If it is able to distinguish UT's policy from the policy at is-
sue in Grutter,"' it could decouple the two cases and reaffirm
Grutter while striking down the Fisher policy. This approach
would be detrimental to UT, but not necessarily to other propo-
nents of racial preferences. It would have minimal effect on the
jurisprudence in this area, although it might confine Grutter's
holding to a limited extent. This will likely appear to the Court to
be the most temperate approach and, therefore, the most attrac-
tive. However, only the following approach is constitutional.
The Court should not decouple the UT and Grutter policies. It
should take UT at its word when it so strongly argues that "UT
Austin's admissions program is precisely the type of system ex-
pressly upheld in Grutter.""' Then it should strike down the poli-
cy, effectively overturning Grutter. This is the risk UT assumed
in emphasizing the similarities between its policy and the Grutter
policy.'5 4 UT's insistence that the Court recognize these similari-
ties could, and should, lead to the dismantling of race-based ad-
missions policies.
152. See Thompson & Schiff, supra note 108, at 471-77 (describing "two obvious ave-
nues where the Supreme Court can distinguish Grutter from Fisher").
153. Brief in Opposition, supra note 129, at 16.
154. Id. In fact, it acknowledged this risk when it said, "If the Plaintiffs are right, Grut-
ter is wrong." Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 612 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
affd, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012)
(No. 11-345).
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V. CONCLUSION
"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.""' Chief Justice Roberts's
simple but poignant words reflect his simple but precise interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause, which makes no exception
for permitting governmental classifications of Americans based
on race. In contrast, Justice O'Connor, in her Grutter opinion,
finds an exception to the Clause allowing racial preferences. The
Court's holding in Grutter persists today and forms the legal
foundation for affirmative action in the nation's HEIs. That foun-
dation, however, is rooted in the concocted and erroneous notion
that diversity is a compelling state interest, sufficient to satisfy
strict scrutiny's first prong. Modern data suggest that racial pref-
erences in education are counterproductive and do not produce
the benefits upon which the diversity theory relies.'
Fisher has recently catapulted the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action to the forefront of the nation's legal debate. The case is
significant because of its similarities to Grutter. Not only does UT
justify its racial preferences by invoking diversity, but it also pos-
es its own admission policy as the identical reflection of the policy
upheld in Grutter. In so doing, UT hopes to convince the Court to
reaffirm Grutter and uphold the UT policy on narrow tailoring
grounds. The UT policy is not narrowly tailored, however, as evi-
dence suggests that other available means achieve the same di-
versity goals.
In his special concurrence to the Fifth Circuit's majority opin-
ion, Judge Garza begins with the following:
Whenever a serious piece of judicial writing strays from fundamental
principles of constitutional law, there is usually a portion of such
writing where those principles are articulated, but not followed. So it
goes in Grutter, where a majority of the Court acknowledged strict
scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for race-based preferences
in university admissions, but applied a level of scrutiny markedly
less demanding. To be specific, race now matters in university ad-
missions, where, if strict judicial scrutiny were properly applied, it
should not.1 57
155. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
156. See supra Part II.A.3; see also Sander, supra note 62, at 481-82.
157. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring).
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Judge Garza's dissent demonstrates that Fisher is about much
more than striking down one university's admission policy. Fisher
presents the Court with an opportunity to either reinforce Grutter
or overturn it while recognizing the constitutional infirmity of af-
firmative action. As the Texas Solicitor General rightly summa-
rized, "If the Plaintiffs are right, Grutter is wrong."15' The Court
should strike down UT's race-based admission policy and over-
turn Grutter. If it does not, pernicious, counterproductive, and
unconstitutional racial preferences could become even more en-
trenched in American jurisprudence and persist for years to come.
Brooks H. Spears *
158. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2009, Willsdale
College. The author first learned about the Fisher case while doing research for Todd Ga-
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